The Labour Party Spokesperson on Finance, Deputy Joan Burton, has written to the Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, raising a number of legal and constitutional questions about the draft NAMA legislation.
Referring to Section 58, the key section of the Bill which deals with valuation, Deputy Burton says:
“According to the section, the concept of ‘long-term economic value’ is defined as the value that the property can reasonably be expected to attain in a stable financial system when current crisis conditions are ‘ameliorated’ and in which a future price or yield of the asset is consistent with reasonable expectations having regard to the long-term historical average.
“‘Current crisis conditions’ is not defined in the Bill. Under the Interpretation Act 2005, an enactment must be construed as always speaking. In other words, an Act, whether passed yesterday, 5 years ago or 10 years ago, must be read by a court in the present tense. Specifically, “an enactment continues to have effect and may be applied from time to time as occasion requires”.
“So, given that the NAMA legislation is intended to be in place for at least a decade or so, the basic question arises as to whether ‘current crisis conditions’ means the conditions prevailing at the time the Act is passed or whether it means the conditions then prevailing at any future time when the Act has to be construed and interpreted by a court at a future date.”
Deputy Burton also raises questions about the constitutionality of Section 88 of the Bill section that allows the Minister, by order, to exempt particular undertakings from the application of the general rule enacted under the previous section, section 87.
Citing previous judgements of the Supreme Court, Deputy Burton’s letter says:
“The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Minister to grant exemptions in respect of businesses of a particular class or kind. But it struck down as unconstitutional the power of the Minister to identify and exempt “any particular business” from the application of the general rule of law.
“There is a huge distinction to be made between defining a “class”, by reference to some objectively identifiable characteristics, and simply choosing a single individual to be made exempt from the application of the general rule of law”.
Full Text of Letter:
Brian Lenihan TD
Minister for Finance,
Government Buildings,
Dublin 2.
Re: NAMA legislation draft paper
Dear Minister,
I write to ask two separate, structural questions that arise from the publication of the draft legislation for NAMA. Both of these questions, it seems to me are important. I appreciate that the purpose of publishing the legislation in draft form is in order to allow these questions to be raised in a timely way. I would therefore be grateful if you could furnish a reply at the earliest opportunity.
The first question relates to section 58. As you know, the section is central to the Bill, because it deals with valuation methodology – the price the State will pay for the impaired loans and assets of the participating banks.
According to the section, the concept of “long-term economic value” is defined as the value that the property can reasonably be expected to attain in a stable financial system when current crisis conditions are “ameliorated” and in which a future price or yield of the asset is consistent with reasonable expectations having regard to the long-term historical average.
“Current crisis conditions” is not defined in the Bill. Under the Interpretation Act 2005, an enactment must be construed as always speaking. In other words, an Act, whether passed yesterday, 5 years ago or 10 years ago, must be read by a court in the present tense. Specifically, “an enactment continues to have effect and may be applied from time to time as occasion requires”.
So, given that the NAMA legislation is intended to be in place for at least a decade or so, the basic question arises as to whether “current crisis conditions” means the conditions prevailing at the time the Act is passed or whether it means the conditions then prevailing at any future time when the Act has to be construed and interpreted by a court at a future date.
I presume you accept that the legislation will give rise to litigation and that its interpretation will be a matter for courts to decide for years to come.
The lack of specificity as to the meaning of “current crisis conditions” and the potential difficulty for any court at a future time to work out what the expression means – in particular, the meaning of the word “current” when embodied in a statute that is always speaking in the present tense – seems to me to undermine any attempt to give legal meaning and effect to the notion of “long-term economic value”.
What will a court in 5 years time define as the “conditions” that identify the “current crisis”?
I appreciate that, in its long title, the Bill is an Act to address a serious threat to the economy and to the systemic stability of credit institutions in the State generally.
But, given that “current crisis conditions” and their amelioration are both concepts that appear central to the definition of “long-term economic value” – which is in turn the basic concept that will govern the price to be paid by the State for impaired loans, I would think it is vital to have more spelled-out thinking about what this phrase actually means.
My second query relates to section 88 of the Bill. This section allows the Minister, by order, to exempt particular undertakings from the application of the general rule enacted under the previous section, section 87.
Section 87 is designed to protect “participating institutions” from the negative effects of signing up to NAMA. Presumably, there are various agreements that would trigger payment obligations if a bank signs up to NAMA. The purpose of the section is to make void a number of legal instruments that would otherwise become effective on the passing of the Bill, on an institution becoming a participating institution, or on certain similar eventualities.
But the following section then allows the Minister to make exemptions by order from this rule, “in a particular case”.
You will know that, in East Donegal Co-Operative Ltd. Attorney General [1970] IR 317, the Supreme Court considered a comprehensive assault by the plaintiffs on the Livestock Marts Act 1967.
The plaintiff’s case was against what it contended was excessive and potentially unconstitutional power vested in the Minister by way of regulation of their business.
The plaintiff lost on most points. But it succeeded on one. The Act purported to confer on the Minister the power, “if he so thinks fit, [to] grant exemption from the provisions of this Act in respect of the carrying on of any particular business or business of any particular class or kind”.
The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Minister to grant exemptions in respect of businesses of a particular class or kind. But it struck down as unconstitutional the power of the Minister to identify and exempt “any particular business” from the application of the general rule of law.
There is a huge distinction to be made between defining a “class”, by reference to some objectively identifiable characteristics, and simply choosing a single individual to be made exempt from the application of the general rule of law.
I am sure you and your advisers have considered the East Donegal case in the context of sections 87 and 88.
I would be grateful if you could elaborate as to how you think the provisions of those sections, which seek to enable you to exempt single individuals or institutions from the law as passed by the Oireachtas, sit comfortably with the Constitution as interpreted by the courts.
Thank you for any clarification you can provide in relation to these two specific areas of concern I have identified. No doubt there will be more. I would be grateful for a response at your earliest convenience.
Yours sincerely,
___________________________
Joan Burton TD
Labour party Spokeswoman on Finance